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Among the accomplishments of the last session of the Leg-
islature was the passage of the four Uniform Evidence Acts,
which were then duly signed by the Governor. They are:
House Bill No. 3 17, Uniform Business Records as Evidence
Act; House Bill No. 318, Uniform Composite Reports as Evi-
dence Act; House Bill No. 319, Uniform Official Reports as
Evidence Act; House Bill No. 320, Uniform Judicial Notice
of Foreign Law Act. They all concern topics which are likely
to transcend state lines. They involve proof of various writings
which may have been made in another state or proof of the laws
of a sister state, and so the advantages of uniformity in legisla-
tion are apparent. All of these acts were drafted by the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
and were then approved by the American Bar Association, and
in this state were later recommended by the Ohio State Bar
Association. In each case the proposed Uniform Acts were
amended by the Ohio Legislature. In each case the Legisla-
ture struck out a clause common to all the uniform laws that
all acts or parts of acts which are inconsistent with the provi-
sions of this act are hereby repealed. It is difficult to see what
is gained by the omission. These acts, being later in time, would
by a principle of statutory construction naturally repeal any
clauses of prior acts that were inconsistent with them, and the
section would only express what would otherwise be implied.
In each case the Legislature made at least one other amend-
ment. The effect of these amendments will be considered in
the discussion of the respective acts, their influence being con-
siderably greater in some cases than in others. All of the acts
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as enacted contain a provision that they shall be so interpreted
and construed as to effectuate the general purpose to make uni-
form the law of those states which enact them. One might
suggest that whatever the merits of amendment may be, uni-
formity is not one of them.
UNIFORM BUSINEss RECORDS As EVIDENCE ACT
Probably the most helpful of the Uniform Acts is the first
one, the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act. The need
for some such statute has long been felt. The technical com-
mon law requirements for the proof of a writing have become
less and less suited to the requirements of modern business.
Courts have attempted to liberalize the old requirements, but
their opinions varied greatly from state to state, and piece-meal
statutes added to both the liberality and the confusion.
Under the old common law a party was incompetent as a
witness. A small shopkeeper, who kept no clerk, would be
helpless if his books were not admissible in evidence, and in
early colonial days the practice of receiving the books began.
In New England the party was required to take a suppletory
oath and this was not regarded as testifying, while in New York
the practice derived from the Dutch required the party to prove
that other customers had dealt with the party in reliance on the
books. Numerous limitations were imposed on the doctrine
and from time to time it was held that the books would not be
admitted to prove money lent, goods sold on a third person's
credit, cash transactions, large items, lump charges, etc.
If the shopkeeper employed a clerk, the latter was of course
competent as a witness. If the clerk who made the entries was
dead, a slowly developing, but more orthodox, exception to
the hearsay rule permitted such entries to come in as entries in
the course of business.
A third ground for admitting the writings was the Recol-
lection theory. If the memory of the witness was refreshed he
could testify about the transactions. But even if his memory
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was not refreshed and he could do no more than say, "It must
be so, because I wrote it," the entry was often admitted on a
theory of past or artificial recollection.
When the parties were made competent by statute, there
was no longer any need for the shop book doctrine as such. The
party could now testify freely, and the Recollection theory
would help him if he forgot details. But before the compe-
tency of the parties was secured, the shop book rule was so
thoroughly established in the common law and by statute that
it continued to exercise a considerable effect.
In Ohio, Section I 1493 removes the common law disquali-
fications for witnesses in general, but Section 11495, the Dead
Man Statute, retains the disqualification in certain cases. But
Section I 1495 contains numerous exceptions, and among them
Subdivision 6 provides:
If the claim or defense is founded on a book account, a party may
testify that the book is his account book, that it is a book of original
entries, that the entries therein were made in the regular course of
business by himself, a person since deceased, or a disinterested person.
The book shall then be competent evidence in any case, without regard
to the parties, upon like proof by any competent witness.
The old shop book rule is the basis for this statute. The
books are declared to be admissible in those situations where
the old common law disqualifications of the parties are retained.
But the statute is broader than the old shop book rule. It ad-
mits entries by the party, as does the old rule, but it also admits
entries by a person since deceased, which would come under
the hearsay exception for entries in the course of business and
it also admits entries by a distinterested person which goes
beyond either rule. The section appears in the Statutes as an
exception to an exception, and apparently has no application if
the suit is not by a party, or if it is not against an executor, etc.,
as set out in Section i 1495. In such cases the common law ap-
parently would control.
If the same individual handled the transaction and made
the entry there is usually little difficulty today. Even if he is a
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party to the action he is usually competent, and where a dis-
qualification persists, his books will be received unless some old
limitation of the shop book rule interferes. If the individual is
not a party to the action, he is, as he always was, competent. If
the individual is dead, his entry may be proved as an entry in
the course of business.
But in modern business today there may be a large number
of people who contribute to the sale, receipt or delivery of
goods. The first permanent record may be prepared by a book-
keeper who has seen none of the original transactions and whose
knowledge was gained by a variety of slips given or sent to him
by a considerable number of people.
The common law doctrines were devised for an agricultural
population and for no such system as this. Even so, the books
might be proved if everyone who contributed in any way to the
transaction were put upon the stand and testified to his part in
it. If some of the individuals had since died, no great extension
of the doctrine would be needed to prove their part in it by
competent witnesses and to receive their writings as entries in
the course of business.
But it would be proved with an enormous waste and at a
cost out of all proportion to the evidence desired. The wit-
nesses would ordinarily remember nothing of the event and
could do no more than testify what the routine was or that a
particular entry was theirs and that the facts must have been
so if they had so written. It was of this situation that Judge
Cardozo once said, "The dead hand of the common law should
no longer be applied to such cases."
In recent years some courts have permitted business records
to be proved on the testimony of a bookkeeper or person in
charge of a department without requiring everyone who par-
ticipated in the discussion to be called. Thus mercantile incon-
venience, as well as death or absence, was regarded as a suffi-
cient explanation of unavailability. But other courts have felt
less free to dispense with the calling of witnesses or have be-
lieved that they were strictly limited by their statutes.
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In i926 a committee of the Commonwealth Fund, after a
study of the decisions and a questionnaire sent to a large num-
ber of industrial firms, submitted the following:
Any writing or record, whether in the form of an entry in a book
or otherwise, made as a memorandum or record of any act, transaction,
occurrence or event shall be admissible in evidence in proof of said act,
transaction, occurrence or event if the trial judge shall find that it was
made in the regular course of business and that it was the regular course
of such business to make such memorandum or record at the time of
such act, transaction, occurrence or event or within a reasonable time
thereafter. All other circumstances of the making of such writing or
record, including lack of personal knowledge by the entrant or maker
may be shown to affect its weight, but they shall not affect its admissi-
bility. The term business shall include business, profession, occupation
and calling of every kind.
This act was adopted in New York, Maryland, Oregon and
Michigan, the Michigan statute adding a statement that the
lack of an entry regarding such an act might be received as evi-
dence that no such act took place. It was also adopted by Con-
gress in 1936. A somewhat similar law has been in effect in
Massachusetts for some time and the Massachusetts act served
as a pattern for the laws of Rhode Island and Maine. The
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, after pointing out that
the Commonwealth Fund Act had been adopted in several
states but "with occasional verbal alterations," added that they
had "attempted to devise a standard wording, which will serve
to uniformize its provisions as it gets adopted from time to
time in other states."
The act, as adopted by the Ohio Legislature, is as follows:
Section I. The term "business" shall include every kind of business,
profession, occupation, calling or operation of institutions, whether car-
ried on for profit or not.
Section 2. A record of an act, condition or event, shall, in so far as
relevant, be competent evidence if the custodian or the person who made
such record or under -whose superzvsion such record was made testifies
to its identity and the mode of its preparation, and if it was made in the
regular course of business, at or near the time of the act, condition or
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event, and if, in the opinion of the court, the sources of information,
method and time of preparation were such as to justify its admission.
Section 3. This act shall be so interpreted and construed as to
effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states
which enact it.
Section 4. This act may be cited as the uniform business records as
evidence act.
This'act changes in two respects the one recommended by
the Commissioners of Uniform State Laws and so introduced
into the Legislature. In common with the other Evidence Acts
a section dealing with the repeal of prior inconsistent legisla-
tion has been eliminated. Secondly, the recommended act
which said in Section 2 "custodian or other qualified witness,"
has been changed to read "custodian or the person who made
such record or under whose supervision such record was made."
This defines and to some extent limits the phrase "other quali-
fied witness" but not materially. The qualified witness would
ordinarily be the entrant or the supervisor. A man whose prov-
ince it was to check the entries might be considered an otherwise
qualified witness but would not fall under the words of the
Ohio statute. But it may safely be said that this law has been
enacted without substantial change.
The law is a decided step forward. It gives legal recogni-
tion to the everyday practice of business men. The latter are
accustomed to rely upon the accuracy of books and records after
reasonable evidence is given that they have been properly kept
and the statute authorizes the courts to do the same thing. No
longer will the outgrown shop book exception to the Dead Man
Statute be needed, nor will the court, as in Leonard v. State,'
be forced to run the whole field of the law and attempt to jus-
tify admissibility on the ground of such diverse claims as "shop
books kept . . . in the regular course of business," declarations
against interest, quasi public records, and the limitless res
gestae. A short, simple statute provides for admissibility.
z ioo Ohio St. 456, 127 N.E. 464 (1919).
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UNIFORM COMPOSITE REPORTS As EVIDENCE ACT
This is easily the most advanced of the four new Evidence
Acts. On the other hand, occasions for its employment will
arise less often than for the other laws. As enacted by the Ohio
Legislature, the Composite Reports as Evidence Act provides:
Section I. A written report or finding of facts prepared by an
expert not being a party to the cause, nor an employe of a party, except
for the purpose of making such report or finding, nor financially inter-
ested in the result of the controversy, and containing the conclusions
resulting wholly or partly from written information furnished by the
cooperation of several persons acting for a common purpose, shall, in so
far as the same may be relevant, be admissible when testified to by the
person, or one of the persons, making such report or finding without
calling as witnesses the persons furnishing the information, and without
producing the books or other writings on which the report or finding is
based, if, in the opinion of the court, no substantial injustice will be done
the opposite party.
Section 2. Any person who has furnished information on which
such a report or finding is based may be cross-examined by the adverse
part,, but the fact that his testimony is not obtainable shall not render
the report or finding inadmissible, unless the trial court finds that sub-
stantial injustice would be done to the adverse party by its admission.
Section 3. Such report or finding shall not be admissible unless the
party offering it shall have given notice to the adverse party a reasonable
time before trial of his intention to offer it, together with a copy of the
report or finding, or so much thereof as may relate to the controversy,
and shall also have afforded him a reasonable opportunity to inspect and
copy an), records or other documents in the offering party's possession
or control, on which the report or finding was based, and also the names
of all persons furnishing facts upon which the report or finding was
based.
Section 4. This act shall be so interpreted and construed as to
effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states
which enact it.
Section 5. This act may be cited as the uniform composite reports
as evidence act.
As proposed by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,
another clause was added at the end of Section 3, "except that
LAW JOUR1AL- bEEMBER, 1939
it may be admitted if the trial court finds that no substantial
injustice would result from the failure to give such notice."
This clause, and a section 6, which expressly repealed all acts
inconsistent with this one, were omitted in the Ohio law.
Again, the changes are not material. Of course the requirement
of notice to offer the expert's testimony is made mandatory, in-
stead of discretionary, but a lawyer who intends to rely largely
on the testimony of the expert is not likely to forget it.
The act is intended to expedite proof in the use of expert
testimony, particularly where that testimony relies in part on
information furnished by others. If the common law were to
be strictly construed, all the preliminary writings would first
have to be proved by a number of witnesses who had knowledge
of the facts, and then the expert might be required to detail
any further facts that he might have and then might be per-
mitted to express an opinion upon those facts. In many cases
there is no real dispute about the facts and the requiring of all
possible steps may make the proof too difficult to be worthwhile.
The new act simplifies the procedure in many ways:
(i) It permits the expert to make a report upon which he
might then be examined and cross-examined. Ordinarily the
law requires a witness to answer specific questions propounded
by the attorneys and does not look with favor upon a witness
narrating events. But, as has been argued by Wigmore, the
advantages of a prepared statement in some cases may outweigh
the disadvantages and when an expert has made an investiga-
tion and is called to testify, his testimony may be more lucid
and accurate and certainly better understood, if he first reads
his report stating precisely his observations and inferences.
(2) It does not require the production of books or other
writings on which the report was based if in the opinion of the
court no substantial injustice would be done the opposite party.
When the facts can only be ascertained by the inspection of a
large number of documents made up of numerous detailed
statements, a competent witness who has perused the entire
THE UNIFORM EVIDENCE ACTS 33
mass may be allowed to state the net result. Summaries of
pecuniary accounts or other business records may be offered.
(3) Although the report of the expert is based in whole or
in part on written information furnished by others, the report
may be admitted without calling those other people to the
stand. At strict common law every person who participated
should be called to testify to his part in the transaction or to
the entry that he made of it. If they are not called, the admis-
sion of their entries or anything based on their entries would be
hearsay. Even so, if the entrant were dead, an exception to the
hearsay rule for entries in the course of business would ordi-
narily admit the item, and, as was pointed out in the discussion
of the preceding act, mercantile inconvenience has in recent
years frequently been regarded as a sufficient justification for
not calling all the people involved. In the words of Mr. Wig-
more, "The principle, when too strictly applied, prevents an
expert from testifying to the result of data studied by him but
furnished originally by the observation of other persons. To
require all of them to be called to the stand or accounted for
would be in most cases a needless burden and in some cases
practically an exclusion of their testimony."
Section i is the heart of the act. Section 2 provides some
safeguards for the opposite party. It permits him to call people
who furnished information for the report and it also permits
him to cross-examine those people. So, while the trial court
may admit the report on the testimony of the expert without
calling the other people, the adverse party is not precluded but
may call the others if he so desires. Ordinarily their absence
would make little difference and so the act would do away with
an unnecessary difficulty of proof, but in the exceptional case
their testimony might be material and they could be called.
The section also provides that the report of the expert shall be
admissible although the testimony of the others is not obtain-
able unless the court finds that substantial injustice would be
done by admitting the report. Section 3 requires that notice of
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an intention to use the report of the expert must be given the
opposite party a reasonable time before trial, and under the
Ohio act there is no discretion in the trial court to admit the
report if the notice is not given.
The Composite Reports as Evidence Act is a decided for-
ward step for Ohio and for most of the states. In England
today a judge may refer matters involving special knowledge
to a referee and the report of the referee will be admitted at
the trial. A Rhode Island statute provides that the trial court
may appoint experts and that the report of the experts shall
form part of the record of the cause and shall be produced in
evidence. A recent Wisconsin statute, which was held consti-
tutional in Jessner v. State,2 provides that the trial court may
appoint experts in criminal cases and that such experts shall
prepare written statements which may with the permission of
the court be read by the witness at the trial. Section 13441-4
of the Ohio General Code provided for the appointment by the
court of specialists when insanity is set up as a defense in a
criminal case. It further provided that these experts might pre-
pare a written statement which should be filed and could be
used by counsel in cross-examining the witness, but it did not
provide that such a statement could be read by the witness at
the trial.
UNIFORM OFFICIAL REPORTS AS EVIDENCE ACT
The Public Documents exception to the hearsay rule was
well established at common law. Many public books kept by
various departments of the state or federal government were
admitted in evidence. The public official who made the rele-
vant entries was usually not required to testify, provided the
books were otherwise duly authenticated, and the requirements
of his official position served as a sufficient justification for his
absence. The routine involved in keeping the books and the
regularity of entries in them offered some guarantees of trust-
worthiness.
2 202 Wis. 184, 231 N.W. 634 (1930).
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When the public officer made an investigation of a particular
matter and prepared a report on it, the common law looked
with less favor upon it. There is no such routine or regularity
of entry as in keeping the books. At the other extreme is the
situation where the public official prepares or signs a certificate
which is to be given to a private individual. Here reliance must
ordinarily be placed on the statutes.
In Ohio there apparently was no statute dealing with the
admissibility of public documents in general. A considerable
number provide for the admissibility of specified documents,
usually transcripts, certificates or certified copies. In many
states the reports of public officials whose duty it is to make an
examination of particular businesses are specifically made
admissible. Banks, insurance, lumbering and mines are so
singled out in the laws of different states.
A more general statute is one in effect in Idaho,3 which
provides that entries in public or other official books or rec-
ords made in the performance of his duty by a public officer
are prima facie evidence of the facts stated. And a Wisconsin'
statute provides: "Every official record, report or certificate
made by any public officer, pursuant to law, is prima facie
evidence of the facts which are therein stated and which are
required or permitted to be by such officer recorded, reported
or certified."
The hesitancy of the common law about receiving these
reports of public officials was rapidly being overcome by stat-
utes but the statutes varied greatly in scope. So a uniform act
was suggested, which, as enacted in Ohio, provides:
Section I. Official reports made by officers of this state or certified
coties of the same, on a matter within the scope of their duty as defined
by statute, shall, in so far as relevant, be admitted as evidence of the
facts stated therein.
Section 2. Such report or finding shall be admissible only if the party
offering it has delivered a copy of it or so much thereof as may relate
3 Idaho Code i93z, 16-315.
"Wis. Statutes 1937, 327-IS.
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to the controversy, to the adverse party, a reasonable time before trial,
unless in the opinion of the trial court the adverse party has not been
unfairly surprised by the failure to deliver such copy.
Section 3. Any adverse party may cross-examine any person making
such reports or findings or any person furnishing information used
therein; but the fact that such testimony may not be obtainable shall not
affect the admissibility of the report or finding, unless, in the opinion of
the court, the adverse party is unfairly prejudiced thereby.
Section 4. This act shall be so interpreted and construed as to
effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states
which enact it.
Section 5. This act may be cited as the Uniform Official Reports
as Evidence Act.
Besides omitting the section in this, as well as the other
uniform acts, providing for the repeal of inconsistent provis-
ions, the only change occurs at the beginning of Section i. The
Legislature substituted "Official reports made by officers of this
state, or certified copies of the same" for "Written reports or
findings of fact made by officers of this state." The addition of
the phrase "certified copies of the same" will make no material
difference. As to whether the substitution of "official reports"
for "written reports or findings of fact" will make any consid-
erable difference will depend upon the construction given by
the courts to the phrase "Official Reports." As drawn, the Act
was intended to provide for the admission of the results of
various investigators. "Written reports or findings of fact"
more clearly indicates this than does "Official Reports." Yet
the investigator ordinarily is an official, and he would ordi-
narily prepare a formal report of his work, so that the docu-
ment would usually be admissible in either case. It is noticeable
that the phrase "such report or finding" appears in the second
and third sections, although there is no finding mentioned in
the first section. This may tend to influence the court to give
a broad interpretation to the phrase "official reports."
Again Section i is the heart of the act. Section 2 provides
for notice to the adversary, but the court may admit the report
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although no notice was given if it thinks that the adversary has
not been unfairly surprised. This differs from the preceding
act on that point because an Ohio Court is given no power to
waive the requirements of notice in the Uniform Composite
Reports Act.
Section 3 provides that the adversary may cross-examine
the maker of the report if he desires but that the failure to
obtain such testimony will not ordinarily make the report inad-
missible. There is nothing radical in this provision. Many
government books were admissible at common law although
the entrant was unavailable, and the various statutes providing
for the admissibility of all kinds of documents at least imply
that the presence of the maker of the document will not be
required.
UNIFORM JUDICIAL NOTICE OF FOREIGN LAW ACT
The common law rule is that a state will not take judicial
notice of a foreign law. This was the old common law of
England which has since been changed by statute. In the Eng-
land of two or three centuries ago, foreign law usually meant
the law of some other European country with a system of
jurisprudence based on the Roman law and written in a lan-
guage that English judges could not read. It was reasonable
to require that such foreign laws should be proved in court.
The laws of another country are foreign to those of the
United States and so must be proved. And since the country
is a union of sovereign states, the law of each state is said to be
foreign to the others. Yet practically all are based upon the
common law and all are written in the same language. Similar
problems confront the courts and most of them are answered
in the same way. The judge is the court officer who must know
and apply the local law, and a growing number of lawyers and
judges can see no reason why he is not best fitted to apply the
law of another jurisdiction. In a few states the court has
declared that it will take judicial notice of the law of another
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state. Nowhere has the argument been better stated than by
the New Hampshire court:
There is no sound theory that a judge knows the local law. If
knowledge in all cases were assumed, briefs and arguments would be
anomalous and inconsistent. When he does not know or have the law
in mind, it is his duty to find out what it is in cases calling for its appli-
cation. He may take judicial notice of it, not because of a supposed
knowledge, but because it is contrary to judicial policy that local law
should be ascertained in the manner facts are proved under the law of
evidence. He either knows it or has the most competent knowledge
where to search for it ...
In all states federal law is ascertained by the same process and on
the same theory as domestic law. The judge searches for it and finds
it out. This treatment is said to be because the federal laws are equally
the laws of each state. The reason seems somewhat specious and open
to the charge of opportunism. Between ascertaining federal law and
foreign law there is no real difference of method by the trial judge.
In most states, however, the court has waited for the Legis-
lature, and in the past twenty years about one-third of the
states have passed laws permitting or instructing their courts
to take judicial notice of the laws of other states. The acts
varied considerably in details and so a uniform act was recom-
mended to the states by the commissioners on uniform state
laws. As enacted by the Ohio Legislature, the law provides:
Section i. Every court of this state shall take judicial notice of the
statutes of every state, territory and other jurisdiction of the United
States.
Section 2. The court may inform itself of such laws in such manner
as it may deem proper, and the court may call upon counsel to aid it in
obtaining such information.
Section 3. The determination of such laws shall be made by the
court and not by the jury, and shall be reviewable.
Section 4. Any party may also present to the trial court any admis-
sible evidence of such laws, but, to enable a party to offer evidence of
the law in another jurisdiction or to ask that judicial notice be taken
thereof, reasonable notice shall be given to the adverse parties either in
the pleadings or otherwise.
S aloskin v. Houle, 85 N.H. 126, 155 Adt. 47 (1931)-
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Section 5. The law of a jurisdiction other than those referred to in
Section I shall be an issue for the court, but shall not be subject to the
foregoing provisions concerning judicial notice.
Section 6. This act shall be so interpreted and construed as to
effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states
which enact it.
Section 7. This act may be cited as the Uniform Judicial Notice of
Foreign Law Act.
Aside from omitting the usual section providing for repeal
of inconsistent provisions in other acts, the only change was in
omitting certain words in Section i. As recommended by the
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, the act provided that
the court should take judicial notice of the common law and
statutes. As enacted, the act provides that the court shall take
judicial notice of the statutes. By omitting the phrase, the
co mon, law, the Legislature has made a very material change
in the law, and has probably reduced the effect of the uniform
law by more than fifty per cent. While other states, by the
passage of the uniform acts, or of other statutes, or by judicial
construction are providing for the judicial notice of the laws
of states other than themselves, Ohio has sharply limited the
process. An Ohio judge is to take judicial notice of Ohio law,
of federal law, and of the statutes of other states, but appar-
ently not of the common law of other states. There seems little
reason for drawing such a line of demarcation. The judge
should be the best qualified individual on all of these matters
and should be authorized to take judicial notice of all of them.
The effect of the section is to make the Ohio law more like the
old Uniform Proof of Statutes Act which was adopted by a few
states in i92i than like the recent Uniform Judicial Notice of
Foreign Law Act.
A court may take judicial notice not only of what everyone
knows, or what it knows as a court, but also of matters capable
of exact ascertainment. So there is nothing startling in Section
2 which permits a court to inform itself as it deems proper
or even to call upon counsel to assist.
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Section 3 was designed to change another old rule of the
common law. Since foreign law was regarded as a fact to be
proved, it was often said that like other facts it should be
proved to the satisfaction of the jury. But a jury is not well
equipped to decide questions of law, and calling foreign law
a fact does not add to the ability of the jury. Yet it is only
in recent years that a majority of the courts have held that
questions of foreign law are to be decided by the court and
not by the jury. In Ohio it has frequently been held that the
laws of other states and decisions of their courts must be proved
in evidence as matters of fact.' But the court's control of the
subject matter seems to have been pretty well settled in Ohio
since the decision in Alexander v. Pennsylvania Co.7
In declaring that such laws shall be determined by the court
and not by the jury, the section follows the prevailing modern
theory. It is also a necessary conclusion from Section i, since
if a court will take judicial notice, it obviously follows that the
determination is for the court and not the jury. But since the
Ohio act provides only that judicial notice shall be taken of
6 Ingraham v. Hart, iI Ohio 255 (184.z); Smith v. Bartram, ii Ohio
St. 690 (i86o); Bank v. Baker, 15 Ohio St. 68 (1864.); Whelan's Executor
v. Kingley's Administrator, 26 Ohio St. 131 (1875); Larwell v. Hanover
Savings Fund Society, 40 Ohio St. 274 (1883); Williams v. Finlay, 40 Ohio
St. 342 (1883). And see sec. 11498 General Code.
7 48 Ohio St. 623, 30 N.E. 69 (1891). It does not follow from this,
however, that where, as in the case at bar, numerous decisions of the several
courts of a state are introduced in evidence to a jury as proof of the law of
such state, that the jury should be required to search through them, elucidate
and announce the doctrine they establish; this is often a most difficult and
delicate duty for courts and judges of the greatest skill, learning and experi-
ence to undertake. To submit its performance to a body of men inexperienced
on the examination and construction of judicial decisions, and not familiar
with the general doctrines pertaining to the subject would be to submit the
rights of parties involved in the controversy to be determined by a method
little, if any, more certain than the cast of a die.
In such case it becomes the duty of the court, as in the case of any other
documentary evidence requiring construction, to construe the decisions, the
rulings of the trial court in this respect being subject to review by other courts
having jurisdiction in error, thus securing as much certainty in ascertaining
the law of another state or country as the nature of the subject will admit.
And see to the same effect Ott v. Lake Shore etc. R. Co., 18 Ohio C.C. 395,
aff'd without opinion in 6z Ohio St. 661 (1899).
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the statutes, Section 3 in speaking of "the determination of
such laws" will be regarded as referring only to the statutes.
This furnishes little assistance for the argument that the com-
mon law of another state should be decided by the court except
for reasoning by analogy that if the statutes of other states are
to be determined by judges their common law should also be
so determined.
By Section 4 reasonable notice is to be given to the adverse
party if the court is to be asked to take judicial notice of such
laws. This is only fair. Otherwise an opponent might very
easily be misled by a failure to appreciate that the case was to
be tried by the law of another state.
Section 5 provides that the law of a foreign country shall
be an issue for the court but shall not be subject to judicial
notice. There are much greater differences between the laws
of different countries than the laws of different states. Further-
more they are less accessible and so there is much more reason
for requiring them to be proved. But under this section the
determination of the law of another country is for the court and
not the jury. There being no mention of such laws as in the
three preceding sections, the effect is to make the Ohio law, in
this respect, the same as that of states adopting the act without
amendment. With this section holding clearly enough that the
determination of the law of a foreign country is for the court,
it seems safe to say that the court will reach the same result
about the law of another state, although Section 3 gives us no
answer to that question.
Section 6 expresses a pious hope that the act will be con-
strued so as to make uniform the law of those states which
enact it. This is difficult to reconcile with the amendment to
Section I. Other states are to judicially notice each other's
common law and statutes, while Ohio is to take judicial notice
only of their statutes. Uniformity of interpretation and con-
struction would have been much more likely if the Legislature
in the first place had enacted a truly uniform act.
